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A PROPOSAL FOR THE ABOLITION OF THE
DOMESTIC RELATIONS EXCEPTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Title 28 of the United States Code, Section 1332, appears
to grant original jurisdiction to the federal district courts in all
civil actions which are between citizens of different states
where the matter in controversy exceeds $10,000.1 This grant
of diversity jurisdiction, however, has been limited by two
well-established judicially created exceptions: the probate
exception 2 and the domestic relations exception. 3  Until re-
cently, these exceptions have not been the subject of extensive
scholarly examination.4 This comment exclusively examines
1. The diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982), provides in pertinent part as
follows:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of inter-
ests and costs, and is between-
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign
state are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and
citizens of a State or different or of different States.
1d. at § 1332(a).
2. In Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490 (1946), the Supreme Court held that "a
federal court has no jurisdiction to probate a will or administer an estate." Id. at 494.
See also Moore v. Lindsey, 662 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1981); Rice v. Rice Found., 610 F.2d
471 (7th Cir. 1979). See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 25 (4th
ed. 1983); Vestal & Foster, Implied Limitations on the Diversity Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 1, 13-23 (1956); Note, Federal Jurisdiction and Practice:
Probate Matters, 15 OKLA. L. REV. 462 (1962).
3. See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Alger, 280 U.S. 379, 383 (1930) (federal courts
have no jurisdiction over divorce); Solomon v. Solomon. 516 F.2d 1018, 1024 (3d Cir.
1975) (federal courts do not have jurisdiction in domestic relations suits). See generally
C. WRIGHT, supra note 2; Vestal & Foster, supra note 2.
4. See Atwood. Domestic Relations Cases in Federal Court: Toward a Principled
Exercise of Jursdiction, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 571 (1984); Rush. Domestic Relations Lan"
Federal Jurisdiction and State Sovereignty in Perspective. 60 NOTRr DANMr L. RI.v. I
(1984); Comment, Federal Jurisdiction and the Domestic Relations Exception: .4 Search
for Parameters, 31 UCLA L. REV. 843 (1984) [hereinafter UCLA Comment]; Corn-
ment, Enforcing State Domestic Relations Decrees it Federal Courts. 50 U. CHI. L. Ri:.
1357 (1983), Note, The Domestic Relations Exception to Diversity Jurisdiction. 83
Coi.Om. L. RF.V. 1824 (1983). The probate exception was recently discussed in Note.
The "Probate Exception" to Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: Matters Related to Probate.
48 Mo. L. REV. 564 (1983).
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the domestic relations exception and presents a proposal for
its abolition.
The domestic relations exception mandates that federal
courts dismiss a domestic relations case, even if it satisfies all
of the requirements of the diversity statute,5 because the court
has no power to act.6 Although the United States Supreme
Court originally articulated the domestic relations exception
in dicta,7 and no authoritative analysis of its validity exists,
federal courts continue to observe a "hands off' 8 policy in
cases requiring an inquiry into a marital or parent-child
relationship. 9 The breadth of the exception and the justifi-
cations for it remain unclear. In addition, the courts' appli-
cation of the exception remains unpredictable and
5. See supra note 2.
6. See, e.g., Williamson v. Williamson, 306 F. Supp. 516 (W.D. Okla. 1969)
"[S]ubject matter jurisdiction ... is wholly lacking in a federal court in spite of the fact
that.. ." the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982) have been satisfied.
Id. at 518.
In addition to the domestic relations exception, federal courts may invoke abstention
doctrines to decline jurisdiction in cases which they have the power to decide. Under
the domestic relations exception once a case is characterized as a domestic relations
case, jurisdiction does not exist. Conversely, abstention doctrines, which are judi-
cially created, are characterized as only a postponement of proper jurisdiction. IA J.
MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 0.203 (3d ed. 1985). The United States
Supreme Court has sanctioned abstention in three instances. The Supreme Court has
abstained when a state court decision might eliminate the need to decide a federal ques-
tion. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). In addition, the Court
has sanctioned abstention when the area of activity at issue is intimately regulated by a
state. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). Lastly, the Court has abstained if a
state proceeding is pending. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
To avoid the inherent rigidity in the domestic relations exception, some commenta-
tors have proposed that abstention doctrines be used to limit the volume of domestic
relations cases heard by federal courts. See Atwood, supra note 4, at 475; Note, Appli-
cation of the Federal Abstention Doctrines to the Domestic Relations Exception to Federal
Diversity Jurisdiction, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1095, 1120. A discussion of the application of
the abstention doctrines to the domestic relations exception is beyond the scope of this
comment.
7. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1858).
8. In Kamhi v. Cohen, 512 F.2d 1051 (2d Cir. 1975), the court stated that the
Second Circuit would keep its "federal hands off actions which verge on the matrimo-
nial or impinge upon the matrimonial jurisdiction of the state courts." Id. at 1056.
9. Jagiella v. Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1981). "The general inquiry is
whether hearing the claim will necessitate the court's involvement in domestic issues,
i.e., whether it will require inquiry into the marital or parent-child relationship." Id. at
565.
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inconsistent. 10 Within recent years, a growing number of the
federal courts have questioned the validity and the contours of
the exception.11 Nevertheless, absent an explicit repudiation
of the exception by Congress or the Supreme Court, the lower
courts appear to be unwilling to abolish the exception.12
This comment proposes the repudiation of the domestic
relations exception. Part II explores the murky origins of the
exception.1 3  Part III presents the justifications that courts
have used when they have invoked the exception. 14 Part IV
discusses the federal courts' interpretations of the scope of the
exception. 15 Part V critically analyzes the interpretations and
justifications for the exception as they appear in the lower fed-
eral court decisions.1 6 Finally, Part VI focuses on the policy
grounds supporting the repudiation of the exception and con-
cludes that the domestic relations exception ought to be
abolished.
10. The unsatisfactory state of the law in this area was noted in Solomon v. Solo-
mon, 516 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1975) (Gibbons, J., dissenting). "[T]here is no well-estab-
lished domestic relations exception .... Rather, there is a collection of misstatements
of ancient holdings and ill-considered dicta." Id. at 1030.
11. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982). "The boundaries of
the exception are uncertain .... " Id. at 492; Allen v. Allen, 518 F. Supp. 1234 (E.D.
Pa. 1981). "The critical question, of course, is what a domestic relations case is ....
[There is] a large 'gray area' for future caselaw [sic] development." Id. at 1236.
The domestic relations exception has been traditionally viewed as an exception to
federal diversity jurisdiction. Recently, however, federal courts have been faced with
the issue of whether to apply the exception in the federal question area. See, e.g., Peter-
son v. Babbitt, 708 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1983); Ruffalo v. Civiletti, 702 F.2d 710 (8th Cir.
1983). Circuits which construe the exception broadly tend to apply it in the federal
question area. See, e.g., Zak v. Pilla, 698 F.2d 800 (6th Cir. 1982); Firestone v. Cleve-
land Trust Co., 654 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1981). Those circuits giving narrow construc-
tion to the exception tend not to apply the exception in the federal question area. See,
e.g., Overman v. United States, 563 F.2d 1287 (8th Cir. 1977). "There is, and ought to
be, a continuing federal policy to avoid handling domestic relations cases in federal
court in the absence of important concerns of a constitutional dimension." Id. at 1292.
It is interesting to note that many commentators have assumed that the domestic
relations exception applies only to diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., 13 B. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3609 (2d ed. 1984);
Vestal & Foster, supra note 2.
12. Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842, 843 (1st Cir. 1981); Blank v. Blank, 320 F. Supp
1389, 1391-92 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Druen v. Druen, 247 F. Supp. 754, 756 (D. Colo. 1965).
13. See infra notes 17-35 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 36-64 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 65-106 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 107-163 and accompanying text.
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II. THE ORIGINS OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS
EXCEPTION
The domestic relations exception did not originate in an
unequivocal holding by the United States Supreme Court;
rather it evolved from dicta in two Supreme Court cases. In
Barber v. Barber,'7 the first case in which the Court addressed
the authority of the federal courts to entertain domestic rela-
tions matters, a wife brought a diversity action against her
husband to enforce a previous state court divorce decree
awarding her alimony.18  In upholding federal jurisdiction,
the Court emphasized that the plaintiff was only attempting
to prevent her husband from fraudulently defying an earlier
decree and was not seeking an allowance of alimony.9 The
Court then stated by way of dictum: "We disclaim altogether
any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the
subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony, either as
an original proceeding in chancery or as an incident to divorce
.... "20 The Barber majority opinion, however, did not pro-
vide a rationale for the domestic relations exception. Interest-
ingly, a rationale for the majority's broad dictum was
provided by Justice Daniel's dissent in Barber.2" Many of the
cases dealing with the domestic relations exception cite the
rationale of the majority's dictum as authority for the
exception.22
17. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858).
18. Id. at 583-84. A decree of divorce was issued from the Court of Chancery for
the fourth district of the state of New York, ordering the defendant to pay $360 per year
in support. However, the defendant left New York and subsequently refused to make
the yearly payments. Id. at 585. The plaintiff then brought suit in federal district court
in Wisconsin to enforce the decree. Id. at 586.
19. Id. at 584.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Diruggiero v. Rodgers, 743 F.2d 1009, 1019 (3d Cir. 1984); Flood v.
Braaten, 727 F.2d 303, 307 (3d Cir. 1984); Doe v. Doe, 660 F.2d 101, 105 (4th Cir.
1981); Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1022 (3d Cir. 1975); Phillips, Nizer, Benja-
min, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir. 1973); Williamson v.
Williamson, 306 F. Supp. 516, 517 n.5 (W.D. Okla. 1969); Garberson. v. Garberson, 82
F. Supp. 706, 709 (N.D. Iowa 1949).
22. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 602 (Daniel, J., dissenting). Justice Daniel argued
that the English ecclesiastical courts had exclusive jurisdiction over marriage and di-
vorce. Therefore, since chancery jurisdiction in England had not extended to actions of
divorce or alimony, the federal courts in the United States, as courts of chancery, were
without jurisdiction over such actions. See, e.g., Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 136 (9th
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The Supreme Court significantly expanded Barber's do-
mestic relations exception to include child custody in In re
Burrus.23 In Burrus, the Court dealt with a habeas corpus ac-
tion brought by a father to recover custody of his child.24 Af-
ter holding that the federal court lacked jurisdiction over the
custody dispute because of the absence of essential facts in the
habeas petition, the Court stated in dictum that: "The whole
subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent
and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws
of the United States."25 As in Barber, the Burrus opinion did
not provide a rationale for the dictum.
In two other cases decided shortly after Burrus, the
Supreme Court considered the validity of its broad disclaimer
of jurisdiction over domestic matters. In Simms v. Simms, 26
the Court reaffirmed its language in Barber and Burrus.27 The
Court specified, however, that this restriction did not apply to
jurisdiction over domestic suits in territorial district
courts.28 Seven years later, in De La Rama v. De La Rama, 9
the Court again considered the merits of a territorial divorce
dispute. While reaffirming its earlier dicta and offering for the
first time a reason for the dicta,30 the De La Rama Court,
nevertheless, ruled that the domestic relations exception is in-
applicable to territorial courts.31
Cir. 1982); Bossom v. Bossom, 551 F.2d 474, 476 (2d Cir. 1976); Solomon, 516 F.2d at
1021 n.9. But see Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 491 (7th Cir. 1982).
23. 136 U.S. 586 (1890).
24. Id. at 592-93. Burrus involved a dispute between a father and a grandfather
over the custody of a child under a habeas corpus statute. The Supreme Court held that
the father was improperly imprisoned for disobeying a child custody order issued in a
habeas corpus proceeding because the federal court did not have jurisdiction. Diversity
jurisdiction was not at issue in this case. Id. at 596.
25. Id. at 593-94.
26. 175 U.S. 162 (1899). The question presented to the Supreme Court was
whether it had appellate jurisdiction to review a divorce and alimony degree granted by
Arizona's territorial court. Id. at 165.
27. Id. at 167.
28. Id. at 167-68.
29. 201 U.S. 303 (1906). De La Rama involved an appeal from a divorce suit
brought in a court of first instance in the Phillipines. Id. at 304.
30. The De La Rama Court's justifications for the exception included the difficulty
of establishing diversity and the impossibility of meeting the jurisdictional amount in a
case. Id. at 308. These rationales appear to be only technical obstacles which can be
satisfied in certain cases.
31. Id.
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The final Supreme Court decision in the evolution of the
domestic relations exception was Ohio ex rel Popovici v.
Agler.3 2 In upholding the state court's jurisdiction, the Po-
povici Court held that the Constitution and statutes must be
interpreted in light of the common understanding that the "ju-
risdiction of the courts of the United States over divorces and
alimony always has been denied. ' 33 As authority for this pro-
nouncement of the domestic relations exception, the opinion
cited the dicta from the earlier cases 34 and briefly referred to
the rationale proposed by Justice Daniel's dissent in Barber.5
III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE EXCEPTION
The Supreme Court, through its dicta in Barber and Bur-
rus, laid the foundation for the domestic relations exception.36
However, because of the Supreme Court's failure to fully ex-
plain the exception, the lower federal courts are principally
responsible for the development of the justifications for the
exception. The federal courts have advanced substantially di-
vergent interpretations of the nature of the exception. The
major issue is whether the exception is derived from a lack of
constitutional and/or statutory power,37 or whether it is a dis-
cretionary surrender of jurisdiction based on policy
grounds. 8 If a court bases the existence of the exception on
its lack of power, its discretion is severely limited. Alterna-
32. 280 U.S. 379 (1930). An Ohio state court awarded temporary alimony in a
divorce action against the vice-counsul of Romania. Id. at 382.
33. Id. at 383.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 384. Justice Holmes writing for the Court in Popovici made the following
brief reference to Justice Daniel's rationale: "Suits against consuls and vice consuls,
must be taken to refer to ordinary civil proceedings and not to include what formerly
would have belonged to the ecclesiastical Courts." Id.
36. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1024 (3d Cir. 1975) ("federal
courts do not have jurisdiction in domestic relations suits"); Hernstadt v. Hernstadt,
373 F.2d 316, 317 (2d Cir. 1967) ("it has been uniformly held that federal courts do not
adjudicate cases involving the custody of minors, and.., rights of visitation"); William-
son v. Williamson, 306 F. Supp. 516 (W.D. Okla. 1969) (subject matter jurisdiction is
completely lacking in federal court in spite of the fact that the requirements of § 1332
have not been satisfied).
38. See, e.g., Goins v. Goins, 777 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1985). "Federal courts tradi-
tionally decline to hear cases involving the subject matter of 'domestic relations' despite
the existence of diversity of citizenship." Id. at 1061. Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486,
487-88 (5th Cir. 1978) (applicability of domestic relations exception in light of policy
[Vol. 71:141
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tively, if a court relies on the policy rationales, it is free to
consider changes that would expand its jurisdiction in domes-
tic relations matters.39
Some courts have not distinguished between the con-
stitutional and statutory power to hear and decide a domestic
relations matter.40 The failure to distinguish between these
lack of power rationales appears to be of little practical signifi-
cance because under either rationale the courts' discretion
is limited to its initial determination of whether the case is a
"domestic relations matter."4 In addition, some courts have
chosen to combine the lack of power and the policy rationales
in their analyses. 42  Because the lack of power rationales are
alternatives to the policy rationales rather than their compli-
ments, the merger of these rationales produces confusion and
unpredictability.43
A. Constitutional Justifications
The constitutional justifications for the domestic relations
exception may be divided into two categories: The separation
considerations); Kilduff v. Kilduff, 473 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (federal court
may decline jurisdiction if tortious conduct arose from the marital relationship).
39. The presence of a strong state interest in family law matters appears to have
declined. For example, the development of no-fault divorce in a majority of states and
the relaxation of the requirements of who may marry suggest that the state interest in
regulating domestic relations is no longer as strong as it once was. See KRAUSE, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 804 (1976). See also CLARK, CASES AND
PROBLEMS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 12 (3d ed. 1980).
40. See, e.g., Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 459
U.S. 1014 (1982); Turpin v. Turpin, 415 F. Supp. 12 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
41. See Wand, A Call For the Repudiation of the Domestic Relations Exception to
Federal Jurisdiction, 30 VILL. L. REV., 307, 335 (1985).
42. See, e.g., Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 137 (9th Cir. 1982); Welker v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 502 F. Supp. 268, 269-70 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
It is interesting to note that the Ninth Circuit in Csibi developed a two-tiered analy-
sis. If a case was "at the core of the domestic relations exception," the circuit would
have no subject matter jurisdiction. Csibi, 670 F.2d at 137. However, "where domestic
relations problems are involved tangentially to other issues determinative of the case"
the circuit court may exercise discretion in deciding whether to accept jurisdiction. Id.
43. For example, initially the Welker court states that it "should decline jurisdic-
tion" if the primary issue in the case is the status of the husband and wife. Welker, 502
F. Supp. at 269 (citing Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1968)). However,
the court later states that the case was "not within the power granted to federal courts
.... Welker, 502 F. Supp. at 270. The lack of consistency within this case illustrates
the lack of uniformity among the lower courts in interpreting the rationales for the
exemption.
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of powers justification and the federalism justification." The
separation of powers argument focuses solely on the lack of
power of the federal courts to hear domestic relations cases.
This justification is based on two premises: (1) the jurisdiction
of the federal courts is the same as the English chancery
courts at the time of the Revolution;4 5 and (2) at the time of
the Revolution, the English ecclesiastical courts had exclusive
jurisdiction over domestic relations cases.46 Consequently, the
judicial power over domestic relations lies solely in the state
courts.47 The constitutional rationale of federalism focuses on
the allocation of power between the state and federal gov-
ernments. This rationale relies upon the premise that the fed-
eral government possesses enumerated and limited powers.48
Therefore, some courts argue that the power to regulate do-
mestic relations is reserved to the states because the power is
not granted expressly to the federal government in the
Constitution.49
B. Statutory Justifications
Federal courts have also offered statutory justifications for
the domestic relations exception. ° It has been suggested that
the Barber Court's broad disclaimer of jurisdiction over do-
mestic relations was based on the Judiciary Act of 1789,51
which asserted that federal courts have the power to hear
"suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity."' 52 Be-
44. Note, The Domestic Relations Exception to Diversity Jurisdiction: A Re-Evalu-
ation, 24 B.C.L. REV. 661, 684 (1983).
45. Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank and Trust Co., 215 U.S. 33, 43 (1909);
Jackson v. United States Nat'l Bank, 153 F. Supp. 104, 109 (D. Or. 1957); Albanese v.
Richter, 67 F. Supp. 771, 773 (D. N.J. 1946), aff'd, 161 F.2d 688 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 782 (1947).
46. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 621-24 (3d ed. 1922).
47. Hoadly v. Chase, 126 F. 818, 821 (C.C.D. Ind. 1904).
48. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. The tenth amendment provides that "[t]he powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id.
49. See, e.g., Blank v. Blank, 320 F. Supp. 1389, 1390 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Williamson
v. Williamson, 306 F. Supp. 516, 518 (W.D. Okla. 1969).
50. See Hernstadt v. Hernstadt, 373 F.2d 316, 318 (2d Cir. 1967); Clifford v. Wil-
liams, 131 F. 100. 102 (C.C.D. Wash. 1904).
51. Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). See also C.
WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 25, at 143.
52. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, Sec. 11, 1 Stat. 78.
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cause the power to grant divorces or alimony did not fall
within either common law or equity jurisdiction referred to in
the Judiciary Act, there could be no federal court jurisdiction
over these matters.5 3 The Supreme Court itself has also fo-
cused on whether husbands and wives could establish the di-
verse citizenship required by the diversity statute." The
Supreme Court in De La Rama held that "the husband and
wife cannot usually be citizens of different states, so long as
the marriage relation continues."55 In light of this holding, it
appears that diversity jurisdiction between geographically sep-
arated spouses is precluded. The final statutory justification
enunciated by the courts is that domestic relations matters
cannot be assigned a pecuniary value.5 6 Courts have specifi-
cally held that marital status57 and child custody58 are matters
which cannot be measured by a pecuniary standard. If these
matters are incapable of satisfying the $10,000 "amount in
controversy" requirement of the diversity statute, diversity ju-
risdiction cannot be established.
C. Policy Justifications
Although many courts doubt the validity of the con-
stitutional and statutory rationales for the domestic relations
exception, they frequently offer policy considerations to justify
the exception. 9 Courts have generally advanced three policy
considerations. First, several courts have held that state
courts have a particular competence and expertise in domestic
matters.60 It has been suggested that state courts can process
a large volume of cases more efficiently and monitor family
situations more effectively. 6' Second, courts have focused on
53. C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 25, at 143.
54. De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 307 (1906); Barber v. Barber, 62
U.S. (21 How.) 582, 602 (1858) (Daniels, J., dissenting).
55. De La Rama, 201 U.S. at 307.
56. Rapoport v. Rapoport, 416 F.2d 41, 43 (9th Cir. 1969); Clifford v. Williams,
131 F. 100, 102 (C.C.D. Wash. 1904); Walpert v. Walpert, 329 F. Supp. 25, 26 (D. N.J.
1971).
57. Rapoport, 416 F.2d at 43; Walpert, 329 F. Supp. at 26.
58. Hernstadt v. Hemstadt, 373 F.2d 316, 318 (2d Cir. 1967).
59. Firestone v. Cleveland Trust Co., 654 F.2d 1212, 1215 (6th Cir. 1981); Crouch
v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1978).
60. Firestone, 654 F.2d at 1215; Cherry v. Cherry, 438 F. Supp. 88, 90 (D. Md.
1977).
61. Firestone, 654 F.2d at 1215.
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the flood of litigation which would result from the repudiation
of the exception.6 2 In the absence of congressional disap-
proval of the exception, courts have refused to ignore the ex-
ception because of the fear of increasing the number of cases
on their already congested dockets. Finally, the exception has
been upheld as a way to avoid inconsistancies in federal and
state decrees. It has been suggested that the preservation of
the exception will allow a uniform system of state regulation.63
Proponents of the exception hold that repudiation of the ex-
ception would lead to incompatible federal and state decrees,
which would significantly erode state interest in domestic
matters. 64
IV. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS
EXCEPTION
While the domestic relations exception is firmly estab-
lished in every circuit,65 each circuit has developed its own
approach in dealing with domestic relations matters. Some
circuits have construed the exception narrowly,66 while others
have interpreted the exception more broadly to foreclose juris-
diction in a greater number of cases.67 The variety of interpre-
tations utilized by the circuit courts demonstrates their
current confusion as to the scope of the exception. Generally,
the circuit courts have applied three tests to determine
whether a case falls within the domestic relations exception:
62. Cherry, 438 F. Supp. at 90; Thrower v. Cox, 425 F. Supp. 570, 573 (D. S.C.
1976).
63. See Hart, The Relations Betiveen State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
489, 509 (1954).
64. Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842, 844 (1st Cir. 1981); Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d
486, 487 (5th Cir. 1978).
65. See, e.g., Ruffalo v. Civiletti, 702 F.2d 710, 717 (8th Cir. 1983); Lloyd v. Loef-
fler, 694 F.2d 489, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1982); Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1042
(D.C. Cir. 1982); Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1087 (4th Cir. 1980); Crouch v. Crouch,
566 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1978); Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1021-25 (3d
Cir. 1975); Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1968); Hernstadt v. Hern-
stadt, 373 F.2d 316, 317-18 (2d Cir. 1967); McCarty v. Hollis, 120 F.2d 540, 542 (10th
Cir. 1941); Robinson v. Robinson, 523 F. Supp. 96, 97-98 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Lutsky v.
Lutsky, 310 F. Supp. 517, 518-19 (S.D. Fla. 1970), aff'd, 433 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1970).
66. See, e.g., Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1985); Bennett, 682 F.2d at
1042; Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1982); Crouch, 566 F.2d at 486.
67. Goins v. Goins, 777 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1985); Firestone v. Cleveland Trust
Co., 654 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1981); Solomon, 516 F.2d at 1018.
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(1) the modifiability approach; 68 (2) the property-status in-
quiry;69 and (3) the nature of the case test.70
A. Modifiability Test
In determining whether a particular case falls within the
domestic relations exception, some courts draw a distinction
between actions involving obligations which are modifiable
and actions involving obligations which are not modifiable.
Under this determination, a court becomes directly involved
in the administration of a domestic relations award. 71 There-
fore, modifiable obligations may not be litigated in federal
court. In contrast, the enforcement of a nonmodifiable obliga-
tion may generally be litigated in federal court because the
court's involvement in nonmodifiable matters is not viewed as
direct involvement in domestic relations.7 2 In entertaining
a modification action involving alimony, visitation, or child
support, a federal court would examine the factors which the
state statute sets forth as relevant to the modification. 73 These
statutory factors are seen as matters which are within the spe-
cial expertise and particular interest of the state courts.74 Ac-
cordingly, the implementation of the domestic relations
exception under the modifiability test is based on policy
grounds.
Courts have reached distorted results through the use of
the modifiability test. For example, courts have allowed dam-
ages for interference with a current child custody award
without reconsidering the propriety of the original custody
award or the appropriateness of an injunction ordering contin-
68. See infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 77-88 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 89-106 and accompanying text.
71. Goins, 777 F.2d at 1059; Jagiella v. Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1981); Mor-
ris v. Morris, 273 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1960).
72. Lee v. Hunt, 431 F. Supp. 371 (W.D. La. 1977); Turpin v. Turpin, 415 F. Supp.
12 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
73. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 767.32 (1983-84).
74. In Morris, 273 F.2d at 681-82, the Seventh Circuit stated:
[The] efforts by the district court to assume the broad equitable powers of a
divorce court in passing upon the questions which might arise as to the continu-
ance of the obligation of defendant to make the periodic payments, despite the
possibility of changing circumstances in the future, would involve the district
court in the administration of divorce law in a very real way ....
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uing enforcement of custody. 7- Although litigants may only
seek damages for past breaches in some instances, they may
also be concerned with potential future breaches.76 If a fed-
eral court is chosen and the court applies the modifiability
test, the litigant is placed in the position of having to accept
only damages for past breaches, which is only a partial
remedy.
B. Property-Status Test
Some courts, in analyzing and defining the appropriate
scope of the domestic relations exception, apply a "property-
status" test to determine whether a particular case falls within
the exception. 77 Under the property-status approach, federal
courts "must decline jurisdiction of cases concerning domestic
relations when the primary issue concerns the status of parent
and child or husband and wife." 8 For example, federal
courts are asked primarily to determine the "status" of the
parties in suits involving habeas corpus petitions for cus-
tody,79 suits of divorce,80 and adoption proceedings. 8 Under
the property-status approach, however, federal courts are not
precluded from deciding conflicts between family members in-
volving property rights where no question of status is
presented.82 This approach upheld jurisdiction in an action to
collect damages for a breach of a separation agreement,83 as
well as an action to enforce alimony payments in a divorce or
separation decree 84 because only property questions were in-
75. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Locffleur, 694 F.2d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 1983); Bennett v.
Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1014 (1982). But see Goins
v. Goins, 777 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1985). In Goins, the Fifth Circuit even refused to
grant damages. Id. at 1060.
76. However, in Ruffalo v. Civilleti, 702 F.2d 710, 717 (8th Cir. 1983), the court
held that the domestic relations exception does not bar the granting of an injunction to
compel the return of a child.
77. See, e.g., Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1968); Welker v. Metropoli-
tan Ins. Co., 502 F. Supp. 268 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
78. Buechold, 401 F.2d at 372.
79. Carqueville v. Woodruff, 153 F.2d 1011 (6th Cir. 1946).
80. In re Wilson, 314 F. Supp. 271 (E.D. Tenn. 1970).
81. In re Freiberg, 262 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. La. 1967).
82. See, e.g., Southard v. Southard, 305 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1962); Vann v. Vann, 294
F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Tenn. 1968).
83. Richie v. Richie, 186 F. Supp. 592 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
84. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 583 (1858).
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volved. Moreover, it has been suggested that federal courts
are entitled to hear suits to establish maintenance and support
brought outside the divorce action."
The property-status test is built upon the premise that
property and status matters are distinct. Support for the dis-
tinction between property and status questions can be found
in Maynard v. Hill, 6 where the Supreme Court held that "[i]f
the act declaring the divorce should attempt to interfere with
rights of property vested in either party, a different question
would be presented."87 This language has been interpreted as
suggesting that states should not have exclusive jurisdiction
over property rights issues simply because they arise out of the
same factual situation as the status issues. 88 Assuming prop-
erty and status questions are separate, it seems only logical
that they be recognized as such by the courts.
C. Nature Of The Case
Some courts apply a "nature of the case" test to determine
whether a particular case is embraced by the exception.8 9
This approach involves an examination of the subject matter
of the actual dispute and a consideration of how the actual
dispute related to domestic concerns. 90 The examination of
the facts of a particular case under the "nature of the case"
approach appears to vary from circuit to circuit. Under this
approach, however, the courts have generally denied jurisdic-
tion in actions involving divorce, 91 custody rights92 and sup-
port. 9 3 However, the "nature of the case" approach generally
85. Vestal & Foster, supra note 2, at 29. But cf. Albanese v. Richter, 161 F.2d 688
(3d Cir. 1947) (jurisdiction denied over support action).
86. 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
87. Id. at 206.
88. See Vestal & Foster, supra note 2, at 29.
89. For recent cases adopting this approach see Goins v. Goins, 777 F.2d 1059 (5th
Cir. 1985); Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1985); Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d
1042 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
90. See, e.g., Linscott v. Linscott, 98 F. Supp. 802, 805, (S.D. Iowa 1951).
91. Ostrom v. Ostrom, 231 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1955) (divorce action).
92. Carqueville v. Woodruff, 153 F.2d 1011 (6th Cir. 1946) (habeas corpus pro-
ceeding involving custody).
93. Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1968) (action seeking child support).
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allows the federal courts to decide tort actions including fraud
and suits in contract.94
The "nature of the case" approach was adopted by the
Fourth Circuit in Cole v. Cole,95 in which the plaintiff, an ex-
husband, brought a suit in federal court for compensatory and
punitive damages against his ex-wife. The plaintiff alleged
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, arson and conver-
sion.96 The trial court dismissed the action on the basis of the
domestic relations exception.97 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
reversed, stating "[a court] must consider the exact nature of
the rights asserted or of the breaches alleged." 98 The Cole
court engaged in a two part inquiry in applying the "nature of
the case" approach. The first element of the Cole analysis is
whether the claims could only be brought between family
members.99 The second element is whether a particular action
requires for its resolution the existence of any rule particularly
marital in nature.1 ° The Cole court concluded that if an ac-
tion could arise between strangers and would be cognizable
outside the law of domestic relations, then the case "does not
present any true domestic relations claim."101 The Cole analy-
sis illustrates a careful scrutiny of the facts. This level of scru-
tiny results in a narrow interpretation of the domestic
relations exception.
Not all courts engage in an intense scrutiny of the facts in
a particular case. When a court abstains from an intense scru-
tiny of the facts, it tends to take a broad view of the exception.
For example, in Bacon v. Bacon,10 2 where a woman sought to
recover damages for emotional distress, the court held that
"[s]tripped of its verbiage this is no more - and no less -
94. Dailey v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945) (wife enticed husband to leave
their children); Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (action for fraud).
95. 633 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir. 1980).
96. Id. at 1085-87.
97. Id. at 1087. In light of the domestic relations exception the court concluded
that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
98. Id. at 1088.
99. Id.
100. Id. For example, the claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and
child enticement originated in tort law, not domestic law. Therefore, these claims can-
not be considered "particularly marital in nature". Id.
101. Id.
102. 365 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Or. 1973).
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than a domestic relations case." 113 Under the Cole analysis,
federal jurisdiction could have been upheld in Bacon because
the suit could have arisen between two strangers; the claim
was cognizable outside domestic relations law, namely, in tort
law.
The failure of the circuit courts to scrutinize the facts in a
uniform manner leads to schizophrenic results. The circuit
courts' application of the "nature of the case" approach has
been further complicated by the fact that some circuits have
developed their own labels for what is essentially the "nature
of the case" approach. The Ninth Circuit describes its crite-
rion as the "primary issue" inquiry, 1° while the District of
Columbia Circuit focuses on the essence of the case. 10 5 The
interpretations and application of the "primary" and "es-
sence" approaches has led to inconsistent holdings between
the circuits.10 6
V. ANALYSIS
A. Critique of Interpretations
There are numerous problems with the application of the
three approaches used by the circuit courts to determine the
scope of the domestic relations exception. These problems
are illustrated by an analysis of three recent federal court de-
cisions: Raftery v. Scott,10 7 Bennett v. Bennett,08 and Goins v.
Goins. '0 9
In Raftery, the plaintiff, William Raftery, sought damages
for intentional infliction of emotional distress from his former
103. Id. at 1020. In addition the court asserted that "[t]he language of the com-
plaint shows this to be part of an ongoing series of disputes centering around the dis-
solved but still stormy relationship and status of - and harm to - their children."
Id.
104. See, e.g., Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 137 (9th Cir. 1982); Buechold v. Ortiz,
401 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1968).
105. Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
106. Under the "essence" test in Bennett the court found that the domestic rela-
tions exception did not bar a tort claim. Bennett, 682 F.2d at 1042. However. the
application of the "primary issue test" in Csibi lead the Ninth Circuit to conclude that
the existence of a tort claim did not "circumvent" the exception. Csibi, 670 F.2d at 138.
107. 756 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1985).
108. 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
109. 777 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1985).
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wife." 0  The plaintiff alleged that the distress was a result of
the defendant's effort to destroy his relationship with his
son."' The Fourth Circuit affirmed a verdict against the de-
fendant of $40,000 in compensatory damages and $10,000 in
punitive damages." 2 The court's reasoning rested on two
grounds. Initially, the court applied the "nature of the case"
approach which was enunciated in the Cole decision. The
Raftery court directly stated that the claim for emotional dis-
tress could be brought by those other than family members.' 13
In addition, by holding that the tort claim of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress was "in no way dependent on a pres-
ent or prior family relationship,"' 14 the court implied that the
tortious nature of the claim entitled the plaintiff to bring the
case to federal court. Because the plaintiff's claim was a cog-
nizable tort claim, it was outside the law of domestic relations.
Therefore, the second element of the Cole "nature of the case"
approach was satisfied.115
The Raftery court then engaged in the property-status in-
quiry. 116 The court concluded that in granting jurisdiction for
a damage claim caused by emotional distress, it was not being
asked to make "a determination of entitlement to custody or
any other adjustment of family status."" 7 Although the court
did not directly apply the property-status approach, it implic-
itly did so by stating that it was not faced with a status ques-
tion. Under the facts of Raftery, both the "nature of the case"
inquiry and the property-status approach support federal
jurisdiction.
In Bennett, the plaintiff, a divorced father, brought an ac-
tion in tort seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief
against his former wife for the alleged kidnapping of their
110. Raftery, 756 F.2d at 337.
111. Id. at 336.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 337-38.
114. Id. at 338 (quoting Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 834-35 (4th
Cir.), cerl. denied, 459 U.S. 1014 (1982)).
115. See Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1088 (4th Cir. 1980). A tort action for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress has been held to be outside the law of domestic
relations. See also Wasserman, 671 F.2d at 834, Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560. 380 A.2d
611 (Ct. App. 1977).
116. Rafiery, 756 F.2d at 338.
117. Id. at 338 (quoting Wasserman, 671 F.2d at 835).
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child. 118 The Bennett court subdivided the issue into a discus-
sion of jurisdiction over the monetary damages requested and
the injunctive relief sought. In holding that it had jurisdiction
to decide the damage issue, the court remanded the cause of
action for damages. 1 9 However, the court held that it did not
have jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief. 120
In upholding its jurisdiction over the claim for monetary
damages, the Bennett decision is consistent with the Raftery
decision in that both applied the "nature of the case" inquiry
and the property-status approach. However, in its analysis of
the issue of injunctive relief, the Bennett court abandoned the
dual approach it adopted in its decision to grant jurisdiction
over damages. As to the issue of injunctive relief, the Bennett
court relied solely on the property-status approach, while ig-
noring the "nature of the case" approach. 12 1 In deciding
whether to grant injunctive relief under the property-status
approach, the court would have had to inquire into the pres-
ent status of the child. Therefore, the court chose to decline
jurisdiction as to this issue. 122 If the Bennett court would have
applied the "nature of the case" approach as it was later used
in Raftery,123 it would have determined that a claim for in-
junctive relief could have been brought by a non-family mem-
ber and that the rules of law governing child enticement are
derived from tort law, not domestic law. 2 4 Therefore, under
this approach, the Bennett court would have had jurisdiction
to decide the injunctive relief issue. Under the facts of Ben-
nett, the "nature of the case" approach and the property-sta-
tus approach would have given clearly inconsistent results.
The Bennett decision illustrates that the different ap-
proaches used to determine whether a case falls within the do-
mestic relations exception cannot always be reconciled. In
addition, Judge Edward's dissenting opinion in Bennett points
out that the application of these approaches may lead to irra-
118. Bennett, 682 F.2d at 1041.
119. Id. at 1044.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See supra notes 77-88 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 113 and 115 and accompanying text.
124. See Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1088 (4th Cir. 1980).
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tional and distorted results." 5 For example, in Bennett, the
plaintiff is entitled only to sue repeatedly for damages without
getting his child back. 126 Ironically, this result would not oc-
cur if the suit was brought by a non-family member.
In Goins, the plaintiff filed a suit against her former hus-
band for conspiring and wrongfully taking their child. 2 7 The
plaintiff sought damages for intentional infliction of emotional
distress and civil conspiracy and a modification of a state
court custody order. 28 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the dismissal of the case in its entirety on the basis of the do-
mestic relations exception. 2 9 Interestingly, the Goins court
made no attempt to separately address the claim for damages
and the modification of the custody order in its analysis. This
failure to separate the claims is in direct contrast to the ap-
proach used in Bennett.130
In reaching its determination, the Goins court applied the
modifiability approach and the "nature of the case" ap-
proach.'3' The modifiability approach mandates the dismissal
of the claim for the modification of custody because actual
modification is being sought. 132  Nevertheless, jurisdiction
over the issue of damages seems appropriate under the
modifiability approach because the court is not being asked to
modify a previous decision.
The Goins court also advocated a "broad inquiry" into the
"nature of the claim," 133 similar to the inquiry in Bacon v.
Bacon. 14 This "broad inquiry" approach appears to be a
means to an end, the end being the dismissal of the case. The
"broad inquiry" approach fails to provide the court with an
125. Bennett, 682 F.2d at 1045 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
126. Id.
127. Goins, 777 F.2d at 1060.
128. Id. at 1060.
129. Id. at 1063.
130. Bennett, 682 F.2d at 1042. The Bennett court discussed the claims for dam-
ages and injunctive relief separately. In light of the differences between these two reme-
dies it seems logical to address the remedies separately. Nevertheless, the Bennett
decision is suspect because of the court's failure to apply the "nature of the case" in-
quiry to the claim for injunctive relief.
131. Goins, 777 F.2d at 1061.
132. Id.
133. Id. (quoting Bacon v. Bacon, 365 F. Supp. 1019, 1020 (D. Or. 1973)).
134. 365 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Or. 1973).
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adequate procedure to examine the facts of a case. 35 Rather
than providing the court with any structure or guidance, the
"broad inquiry" approach allows the court to essentially de-
cide a case according to its own personal preference. If the
Goins court would have used the "nature of the case" ap-
proach as enunciated in Raftery, it would have determined
that the plaintiff's claims could have been brought by a non-
family member, and that the relief sought was derived from
tort law. 1 36 Consequently, the application of the Raftery "na-
ture of the case" approach would have granted jurisdiction.
It is apparent that in Goins the application of Raftery "na-
ture of the case" approach and the modifiability approach
would have yielded clearly inconsistent results. More im-
portantly, the Goins opinion illustrates that depending on the
manner in which a specific approach is construed and applied,
specifically the "nature of the case" approach, a court may
reach different conclusions.
B. Critique Of The Justifications
Both constitutional justifications for the domestic relations
exception, based on separation of powers and federalism, are
seriously flawed. The historical support for the separation of
powers rationale is less than conclusive. Historically, federal
courts are viewed as having the same jurisdiction that the
English chancery courts had at the time of the Revolution.'37
Proponents of the domestic relations exception have argued
that the English ecclesiastical courts had exclusive jurisdiction
over domestic matters. 138 In fact, the chancery courts had sig-
nificant, if limited, jurisdiction over domestic matters. For ex-
ample, the chancery enforced separation agreements, 139
135. Raftery, 756 F.2d at 337-38.
136. See, e.g., Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 834-35 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1014 (1982); Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1088 (4th Cir. 1980).
137. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 602-05 (1858) (Daniel, J., dissent-
ing). Jurisdictional disputes in areas other than domestic relations were guided by the
fact that the federal courts have the same authority at common law and in equity as did
the English chancery courts. Id.
138. See, e.g., Ohio ex rel Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 384 (1930); Csibi v.
Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 137-38 (9th Cir. 1982); Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon
v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 513-14 (2d Cir. 1973).
139. Head v. Head, 26 Eng. Rep. 972 (Ch. 1745).
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decided the validity of marriage suits, 4 ' and issued extraordi-
nary writs' 4 ' in the domestic relations context. Therefore, if
the federal courts' jurisdiction is the same as the chancery
courts, it appears that federal courts are not foreclosed from
deciding domestic relations matters.
142
The separation of powers rationale is also tenuous in light
of the Supreme Court's decision in Simms v. Simms 143 and De
La Rama v. De La Rama.1" In both cases, the Court upheld
the power of the federal courts to hear divorce suits in the
territories. The fact that the federal courts may enforce a do-
mestic relations policy which is promulgated by a territorial
legislature'45 indicates that there is no constitutional bar based
on separation of powers. The federalism justification is also
weak, despite the fact that the federal government has no
power to directly regulate domestic concerns. In reliance
upon the federalism justification, courts have held that the
power to regulate domestic matters is reserved to the states. 1
46
These courts, however, have failed to recognize the crucial
distinction between the power to create substantive rules of
law and the power to decide a case.
The federalism rationale stands for the proposition that
the federal courts have no power to create substantive law in
domestic matters. This is not the same as holding that federal
courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over domestic
matters. The fact that federal courts under Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins, 147 are compelled to apply state law in diversity
cases suggests that federal courts may decide domestic mat-
ters. Specifically, Erie suggests that when the federal courts
exercise diversity jurisdiction, they are being asked to decide
140. Pride v. Earl of Bath, 83 Eng. Rep. 755 (K.B. 1700).
141. Heyn's Case, 35 Eng. Rep. 288 (Ch. 1813).
142. The overlap in jurisdiction between the chancery and ecclesiastical courts of
England was outlined in Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 802-03 (E.D.N.Y. 1968)
(cites numerous English precedent). Recently courts have questioned the validity of
this justification. See, e.g., LLoyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1982);
Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 843, 843-44 (1st Cir. 1981).
143. 175 U.S. 162 (1899).
144. 201 U.S. 303 (1906).
145. De La Rama, 201 U.S. at 308; Simms, 175 U.S. at 168.
146. Blank v. Blank, 320 F. Supp. 1389, 1390 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
147. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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matters over which they have no power to "make law."' 48
Thus, the conclusion that federal courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction over domestic matters appears to be in direct con-
flict with the concept of diversity jurisdiction as enunciated in
Erie.149
The earliest of the statutory justifications, that the power
to grant divorces or alimony did not fall within common law
or equity jurisdiction, is also questionable. 150 The justification
appears to no longer have any force because equity and law
jurisdictions were merged into jurisdiction over "civil actions"
in 1948.151 Thus, it is moot whether domestic matters were
included in law or equity jurisdiction. The statutory rationale
that no diversity jurisdiction can exist between spouses' 52 is
also invalid. 53 Today, it is recognized that diversity jurisdic-
tion exists so long as a person establishes citizenship different
from that of his or her spouse.15 4
In limited instances the final statutory justification, which
concerns the amount in controversy, appears to be the only
valid nonpolicy rationale.155 The argument that the requisite
$10,000 "amount in controversy" cannot be satisfied is appli-
cable in cases such as child custody actions. 156 However, the
pecuniary value argument is equally applicable to all cases
concerning diversity jurisdiction. Because this argument is
not exclusive to domestic relations, it loses much of its force.
Although the policy justifications for the exception are
more compelling than the constitutional or statutory justi-
fications, they too can be effectively rebutted. The state exper-
tise or competence rationale is probably the least convincing
148. Id.
149. To argue that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction is inconsistent.
When federal courts exercise diversity jurisdiction they are deciding matters over which
the federal government has no power to "make" law.
150. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
151. C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 25, at 97. It is interesting to note that the Revi-
sor's Notes to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 suggest that the sole purpose of this amendment was to
achieve conformity with the language of Rule 2 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 28
U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West 1966) (Historical and Revisors Notes).
152. This argument was presented in Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1021
(3d Cir. 1975).
153. See De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 307 (1906).
154. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 11, at 23 (1968).
155. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
156. Clifford v. Williams, 131 F. 100, 102 (C.C.D. Wash. 1904).
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of the policy rationales. Undoubtedly, state courts have
greater expertise and competence in domestic affairs.15 7 How-
ever, this rationale is more a statement about the result of the
years of application of the exception rather than a justifica-
tion for it. There is simply no reason to believe that federal
judges would be unable to master the subject of domestic rela-
tions. Courts invoking the exception often rely on the "practi-
cal reason" that allowing domestic matters into the federal
courts would only add to the already congested federal dock-
ets. 58 The validity of this justification is suspect in light of the
Supreme Court's language in Thermtron Products, Inc. v.
Hermansdorfer.159 In Thermtron, the Court stressed the im-
propriety of the federal courts refusing to hear cases solely
because they are "too busy.' 60
In addition, the argument that the exception is necessary
to preserve the strong state interest in domestic relations by
maintaining a uniform system of state regulation is also un-
convincing. 161 It is tenuous to assert that federal judges will
not apply state domestic law in a less uniform manner than
state judges. The Erie decision compels a federal court to ap-
ply state substantive law. 16 2 Furthermore, the general relaxa-
tion in the regulation of marriage and divorce by the states
illustrates the decline of the state interest in domestic
matters. 1
63
VI. PROPOSAL: ABOLISHMENT
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the federal
courts' application of the domestic relations exception re-
157. See, e.g., Ruffalo v. Civiletti, 702 F.2d 710, 717 (8th Cir. 1983); Armstrong v.
Armstrong, 508 F.2d 348, 350 (1st Cir. 1974); Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371, 373 (9th
Cir. 1968).
158. See, e.g., Cherry v. Cherry, 438 F. Supp. 88, 90 (D. Md. 1977) (overcrowded
dockets rationale has been used by the courts in other contexts other than domestic
relations); Thrower v. Cox, 425 F. Supp. 570 (D.S.C. 1976). "We [do not] need to
create an additional bureaucracy to needlessly duplicate these state services." Id. at
573.
159. 423 U.S. 336 (1976).
160. Id. at 344.
161. For examples of cases relying on this justification see Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d
842, 844 (1st Cir. 1981); Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1978).
162. Erie R.R. Co., 304 U.S. 64.
163. See supra note 39.
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mains unpredictable and inconsistent. A more serious prob-
lem, however, is that the exception denies access to the federal
courts in cases where federal jurisdiction may be especially ap-
propriate. A traditional rationale for diversity jurisdiction is
that state courts are biased against out-of-state litigants.' 64
Studies have indicated that the possibility of bias against out-
of-state litigants enters into the decisions of attorneys as to
whether to choose a federal or state court. 65
Clearly, domestic relations cases present local bias con-
cerns. Both the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 166
and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act 67 were direct
responses to the state courts' penchant for "hometowning. "168
However, the open-ended language of the Uniform Child Cus-
tody Jurisdiction Act invited judicial discretion which has
been utilized by the state courts to rule in favor of their own
residents. 69 In addition, some states have modified child cus-
tody decrees issued by other states by awarding custody to
their own residents, in contravention of the Parental Kid-
napping Prevention Act. When such contravention occurs,
federal courts have become involved. As might be expected,
the circuit courts have reached inconsistent conclusions as to
whether the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act creates a
cause of action in federal courts.170 These custody determina-
164. T. Marvell, The Rationales For Federal Question Jurisdiction: An Empirical
Examination of Student Rights Litigation, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1315, 1342.
165. Goldman & Marks, Diversity Jurisdiction and Local Bias: A Preliminary Em-
pirical Inquiry, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 93 (1980). (Forty percent of the lawyers felt that
local bias against an out-of-state resident was at least slightly important in choosing a
forum); Note, The Choice Between State and Federal Court in Diversity Cases in Vir-
ginia, 51 VA. L. REV. 178 (1965) (The most commonly cited factors for selecting fed-
eral court when representing the plaintiff were discovery, prejudice against out-of-
state plaintiffs, pretrial conferences and third party practice.).
166. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction at §§ 1-28, 9 U.L.A. 116 (1968).
167. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1983).
168. See generally Sampson, What's Wrong With the UCCJA? Punitive Decrees and
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29 (Spring 1981).
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51 (1983).
170. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547 (9th Cir. 1986) (Parent Kid-
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tions should be made according to the best interest of the
child and not those of the resident litigant.'7 ' Allowing fed-
eral courts to hear custody determinations originally would
eliminate local bias, thus ensuring that the child's best inter-
ests are served.
The tendency of the state courts to favor their own resi-
dents is not necessarily peculiar to child custody questions.
Local bias may also threaten the integrity of judgments in dis-
putes involving alimony, child support, or property division.
In light of the exception's unconvincing rationales, inconsis-
tent application, and the existence of local bias in domestic
matters, it is apparent that the domestic relations exception
should be abolished.
The practical effects of abolishing the domestic relations
exception would not be as great as proponents of the excep-
tion suggest. The inability of litigants to satisfy the diversity
of citizenship and the amount in controversy requirements
will severely limit the number of domestic relations cases
heard in federal court. In addition, despite the availability of
a federal forum, many litigants will select state forums in-
stead. Attorneys may choose a state court over a federal court
because of lower litigation costs, familiarity with judges, the
greater degree of participation by the judges in the trial,172 and
the perception of greater state court expertise in domestic
relations. Accordingly, the abolishment of the exception will
not cause a flood of domestic relations cases into the federal
courts.
VII. CONCLUSION
The domestic relations exception has dubious historical
origins. 173 Nevertheless, the exception has become an en-
grained tradition in the federal courts. The break with tradi-
tion which is necessary to abolish the exception will not come
easily.
171. See, e.g., WIs. STAT. § 767.24(2) (1985-86).
172. Note, Family Law: Court's Adoption of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act Ofers Little Hope of Resolving Child Custody Conflicts, 60 MINN. L. REV. 820
(1976).
173. See supra notes 17-35 and accompanying text.
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The justifications for the exception are outdated and un-
convincing. The inconsistency in the application of the excep-
tion is unacceptable. Moreover, domestic relations cases
involving parties of diverse citizenship present significant
problems of local bias which diversity jurisdiction was meant
to prevent. Clearly, concerns of fairness and uniformity must
override any practical reasons for continued adherence to the
exception. Although the abolition of the exception will
broaden the range of cases now heard in the federal courts, it
is clear that there are sufficient restrictions to limit the
number of cases brought to federal court. Consequently, the
domestic relations exception ought to be abolished.
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